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Abstract: In today’s world communication is relying heavily on electronic
means, both for voice and other native data. All these communication ses-
sions leave behind journaling information by the very nature of the underlying
services. This information is both sensitive with respect to user’s rights and
important for law enforcement purposes, so proper storage and retrieval tech-
niques have to be taken into consideration. The paper discusses such techniques
in relation with recent EU recommendations and suggests some methods for
achieving good performance while preserving the required security levels.
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1 Introduction
During the last years we have seen an increasing interest in secure storage and retrieval of
journaling archives of various transactions. The possibility of fraud or inappropriate usage of
resources have led to laws and regulations regarding storage of transaction history for phone calls,
SMS, e-mail traﬃc and other forms of communication. Speciﬁcally, the European Parliament
and the Council of the European Union have adopted a directive (2006/24/EC) [1] which gives
guidelines for retention of data collected from publicly available communication services or public
communication networks, in order to ensure that the data is available for investigation, detection
and prosecution of serious crime.
Usually, the devices that perform the actual communication function are generating logging
data that can identify the peers, time attributes and other relevant details of the transaction.
These logs have been traditionally used for billing and eventually for statistical purposes by
the network operators themselves. Since this information was stored anyway by the operators,
the law enforcement agencies could make use of them for speciﬁc purposes within a frame more
or less regulated by each country laws. Currently, many states are requiring the voice and
data operators to store these logs for a well-deﬁned period of time and to present them timely
when legally requested by various law-enforcement entities. In order for this information to be
useful for investigation and furthermore for prosecution, there is an implicit requirement that
the information contained by the logs cannot be tampered with.
Even if the operators should not (or actually may not) capture and store the actual content
of the communication, there are also increasing concerns about the privacy of the service users
related to their communication partners. Wholesale collection of user communication actions
and habits can be viewed as a breach of privacy, so strong protection against casual browsing or
unauthorized intentional usage of this information should be provided.
When combining the long-term storage and eﬃcient retrieval requirements with privacy, non-
repudiation, integrity, performance and cost requirements, the task of data retention becomes
non-trivial.
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2 System structure, main requirements and challenges
The communication network operator has to manage during normal operation several pieces
of information about each communication session. At the bare minimum this information is used
to establish communication channels and to ensure correct traﬃc ﬂow but it may also be stored
and used for billing purposes. We will call such information about one user session Call Detail
Record (CDR) as this is the name commonly used by voice service providers. For simplicity
we will also name the communication session call but all reasoning below applies also for data
sessions (e-mail, Internet sessions).
The records originate in the network equipment (central switch, access infrastructure), which
have limited ability to store data, so periodically the records are transferred into database systems
where they are processed (e.g. for billing) and ﬁnally discarded. If CDR retention is desired,
the records are also stored for a rather extended period of time in some sort of semi-persistent
storage until lawfully required through a query or until the retention period expires.
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Figure 1: CDR data ﬂow and data retention
For the purpose of this discussion we will not consider the billing path because this is part
of the existing business model of the operator and is already well-established and less likely to
accept any change. User data may be exposed there but this is an old threat, which is supposedly
already handled by operator’s procedures. Furthermore, the lifecycle of user sensitive data there
is relatively short (one month or at most a couple of months) and the impact of integrity loss is
only eventually ﬁnancial to the operator but not deeply legal to the user.
The CDR data can be attacked:
 Before entering the retention system;
 While stored in the retention system;
 During query;
 After supposed deletion.
We will consider that the attacks performed before entry in the retention system have a low
risk because the data stays in transit between network equipment and storage for a short period
of time, the path is internal to the operator (thus is reasonably secure) and more important, the
attacks are likely to take place only after a reasonable long time after the call is placed (otherwise
the attacker would have refrained from making the call at all or would have attacked directly
the network infrastructure to obtain an untraceable call).
The attacks on CDR data during the query may be:
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 Impersonating authorized entities;
 Query alteration;
 Result alteration;
 Result disclosure.
All those can be stopped by proper signing and encryption of the request and the result.
The attacks after supposed deletion are disclosure attacks and would attempt to extract
protected information from media used to store CDR data in the retention system. Encrypting
the data is of course the main protection method but ciphertext-extensive attacks may exist
which exploit the very large amount of encrypted data. To avoid these attacks write-once media
should be destroyed properly and rewritable media should be properly erased after retention
time expires.
We will focus on data stored in the retention system, because the CDR data stays there a
rather long time (at least 6 months, according to EU recommendation) and the attacks may be
either against the conﬁdentiality or against the integrity of the data.
The CDR retention system has to take steps to prevent at least the following attack types:
 unauthorized disclosure of call detail, either for a particular call, a particular originator or
a particular termination
 alteration of call detail (originator, termination, start/end time, other details)
 complete removal of one call or of all calls matching a particular originator, termination or
time interval
 complete denial of service against the retention system
When evaluation the potential solutions we should also consider the size of the problem.
One reasonably large operator may easily originate or terminate in excess of 10M calls per day
(probably at least one order of magnitude more in the case of data services). At a minimum,
a CDR will contain the originating subscriber number or identiﬁer (at least 10 characters),
termination or forwarding subscriber number (at least 10 characters), starting timestamp and
duration (about 6 characters). To cover all situations (international dial numbers) additional
space has to be reserved. In the case of mobile services additional location data is required
and data services may have longer identiﬁcation tokens. We estimate therefore the raw CDR to
require at least 32 bytes of storage, leading to a minimum ﬁgure of 320MB of raw data to be
stored for each day of traﬃc. This extends to about 10GB monthly and 120 GB yearly.
The above ﬁgures may appear small by today’s standards in memory and storage capacity,
but they are absolute minimum estimates of raw data. In a working system there should be
protection which is obviously introduced by encryption and a working system should oﬀer some
sort of direct random access to the data, preferably optimized like an indexed database query.
Both features have storage overhead and we consider it to be tenfold from extrapolating previous
experiences. In the end the retention system will probably have to deal securely with about
500GB of data for a 6 month retention period on the assumption of 10M calls per day.
The above estimation may still appear small by comparison to a large business platform,
but we should keep in mind that the CDR retention system is a non-proﬁtable investment for
the operator so one cannot expect it to use signiﬁcant resources in terms of purchased hardware
or software. Fortunately, the criteria for common queries are limited: by originator identiﬁer
(directly or indirectly mapped through user identity), by termination identiﬁer and by time
interval.
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3 Potential solutions
According to the problem description we should ﬁgure how to store the data and how to
eﬃciently retrieve the required CDR according to the typical query criteria.
3.1 Direct WORM storage
One obvious approach is to use WORM media, given that the write-once feature will provide
tampering protection. This approach will not automatically solve the conﬁdentiality issue, so
some additional measures have to be taken. The main disadvantage of passive WORM media is
capacity. Considering the above estimations, plain passive WORM media is not suﬃcient unless
the time span for data written on one support is short. The time span should also be as short
as possible, because data is protected only after write, and data in transit will be vulnerable to
integrity attacks. Short time spans on one support will translate into many media units for the
entire retention period, making the query process diﬃcult and time-consuming. The speed of
passive WORM media is also limited, aﬀecting the query performance.
A better performing approach is to use special active WORM devices. These are special
storage units presenting the WORM feature at the access port (Ethernet, SCSI) but backed
by conventional magnetic storage. The WORM feature is protected by dedicated interface and
ﬁrmware and the whole device is tamper-proof. This kind of device oﬀers good protection but is
usually expensive and its main use case is append to log. Our goal is to map database-like search
capabilities over the protected data and the append to log restricted primitive is not friendly
with common database engines and their storage management.
The lesser version of active WORM is a hybrid software system that achieves the write once
feature by modiﬁcation of the operating system block drivers or by a custom operating system [2].
The protection it provides may be reasonable but far weaker than the one oﬀered by true passive
optical media. This hybrid alternative fails to be database-friendly, too.
All the solutions based mainly on WORM devices will amount to periodically storing the
CDR logs and sequentially scanning those for each query. This is not very eﬃcient; especially
considering that all the data that is sequentially scanned will be encrypted for conﬁdentiality
purposes.
3.2 Database backed by WORM storage
A slightly better solution would be to use a true database for query purposes and a passive
WORM reference for result validation.
The CDR data would both be stored in the database and consolidated with a reasonable short
interval to WORM storage (passive media should be OK). The initial query would be performed
over the regular database and the integrity of the database itself might be checked against some
hash checks stored on WORM media. The solution is fragile and may not provide either the
required level of integrity or the desired level of performance.
Some DBMS (e.g. Oracle) oﬀer the possibility to split the storage segments over read-write
and read-only media. In such a simple scenario, the retention time window would be split in
several fragments out of which only the last one is residing on read-write storage. Of course,
management of splitting would be rather complicated and there are certain limitations in place
which would limit the reasonable unsafe fragment to at least one week. The solution has the
disadvantage of poor query performance for time frames located on read-only media, but the
main disadvantage is that the unsafe fragment cannot be protected even if conventional row-
level encryption is applied. Little can be done to actually prevent the rows in the read-write
partition from being maliciously created, changed or deleted. Security mechanisms at database
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level do exist but we are looking for an additional layer of trust, which would rule out any
database authority from tampering the data.
By using encryption at row level one can simply prevent row changing and unauthorized
row creation [3]. Eﬃcient query is possible by index-scan over plaintext time attributes or by
index-scan over pre-encrypted source or target ﬁelds. Unfortunately row deletion can be always
performed at some authority level without being even detected.
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Figure 2: Row content is protected but rows can be deleted
3.3 Database with cross-linked rows backed by WORM storage
An improved solution is using results of our previous work, namely row chaining [4] [5]. Beside
symmetrical encryption for conﬁdentiality protection and row-level signature for row integrity
and authenticity protection we use a chaining scheme that links one row to the previous one.
The scheme can detect row deletion unless a whole block of rows from the end are collectively
deleted. This would be solved by building the chain two ways, at the cost of revisiting previous
records. Given the volume and the dynamic of data we consider a single chain is providing
enough protection.
 
Dur
.. 
Dur
.. 
S’.
. 
S’.
. 
S’.
. 
Source Target Start time Dur
.. 
Source Target Start time 
Source Target Start time 
Symmetrical encryption 
Sig 
Sig 
Sig 
Row-level signature 
Figure 3: Rows protected by chaining cannot be deleted
Using the chaining scheme has the great advantage of relieving us from calling the WORM
storage upon each query. The CDR data can now reside entirely in plain read-write database
storage as its integrity is now protected by chains and signatures. When a query is presented, the
results are quickly determined at regular database speed, and then the result-set is validated by
walking the chain one or two steps for each record. The WORM storage is still required in case
tampering is detected in any form and as a backup to avoid denial-of-service attacks (complete
corruption of the database).
The above scheme has however a ﬂaw and can be improved. One can maliciously alter the
database indexes to skip certain records, and those records will never be returned in the result
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set even if they are present in the database and the storage structure is still cryptographically
intact. All checks will succeed, even for queries returning rows adjacent to the masked ones.
The solution is to build the chains not on subsequent rows as they are added to the database
but on rows belonging to the same source or the same target. This means that the database
will contain a chain of rows for each source and a chain of rows for each target. There is a new
eﬃciency issue here, because we will need two chaining ﬁelds, one for source and one for target.
The issue of protecting the last record in the chain becomes also apparently more sensitive,
because the open ends of the chains are living longer. However, undetected deletion of a row
requires that it is at the open end of both source and target chains, which is unlikely to happen
for long in regular traﬃc.
4 Aggregation attack and countermeasures
So far we have considered that encrypting the source and the target ﬁelds oﬀers appropriate
protection against disclosure of the actual participants to a call. Unfortunately, in order to
beneﬁt from indexed search a particular source or target identiﬁer has to be encrypted always
with the same key, yielding the same encrypted value. The key does not have to be the same
for all encryptions (actually should be changed over the source-target population) but once an
identiﬁer is encrypted in the system it should use the same ciphertext representation.
This invariance property required for indexing opens a path for aggregation attacks. Say
the attacker has access to the database (either online or in archived form) and is looking for
source A, but does not know the key. Actually it does not need to. If the attacker knows that A
has placed calls at some particular moments in time it can aggregate through the data looking
for that particular call pattern. Once it ﬁnds it all the past and future CDR involving A (at
least as source) are accessible. The required number of such ﬁxed points is not very high, as
it was previously proven in aggregation attacks on blinded statistical data. The success of the
attack depends on the traﬃc volume around the known time-points and on the number of the
time-points available. The attacker may even optimize its chances by explicitly placing calls to
A at low-traﬃc time intervals or if the attacker is itself A, by making calls at such well-chosen
moments.
To provide some level of protection against this kind of attack we have to dilute the resolution
the attacker has in the time domain when building a candidate set based on a given timestamp.
When the attacker has a timestamp it can eﬀectively build a set of sources or destinations that
have placed or received a call at that moment in time. If the timestamp is say 11:00:00 AM,
the set will be likely large (high traﬃc at busy hours) but if the timestamp is 03:00:00 AM
the set will be considerably smaller. The time resolution dilution has to be made by sacriﬁcing
performance at some level. We will store in the Start time ﬁeld a down-rounded timestamp and
in an additional encrypted ﬁeld the oﬀset of the actual start time. This will reduce the resolution
of the time searches and will entail some sequential processing to achieve exact query results.
However, since the query speciﬁes typically also the source or the target the performance penalty
will be small (will use source or target indexes). On the other hand, the attacker has only the
degraded start time to work with. To further reﬁne the protection, the rounding should be made
according to traﬃc patterns. Lower traﬃc intervals should be larger and higher traﬃc intervals
may be smaller. This helps reducing the performance degradation we mentioned before and
can be achieved by a Hamming-like algorithm applied once in a while to determine the optimal
rounding intervals.
Even when using the rounding method to protect against data aggregation, special care should
be taken with respect to the data storage pattern. All records have to be added incrementally
with the starting timestamp (or eventually the end timestamp) because that is the way they come
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from the network device logs. If the rounding algorithm performs for example the rounding at
23:00, 01:00, 05:00 the attacker may place a call shortly after 01:00 AM and look for records after
but in close proximity of the Start time switch from 23:00 to 01:00. The solution is to randomly
shift the rounding boundaries each day with at least 10% of the theoretical interval size.
5 Conclusions and Future Works
Designing and implementing a system which provides secure data retention of Call Detail
Records is not a trivial task. There are several inter-related issues ranging from storage methods
to data protection by encryption, and from eﬃcient query to safe implementation. Unfortunately
we have to note that in the current form, secure data retention has little driving force. The
operators that manage the data have little to gain by properly implementing such a system
and proper implementation is not necessarily cheap. The laws mandating the presence of such
systems are rather vague on the required security and performance levels for such systems. The
potential direct users have no direct means to encourage proper (read fast) implementations and
the real owners of the call data (the subscribers) have also little means to encourage proper (read
secure) implementations.
We however tried to outline within the limited size of this paper some of the requirements
and the challenges related to such a system together with means to achieve a safe system with
good performance.
Of course, each link in the chain has its very important contribution to the overall strength
and there are many details left uncovered. Some directions may be: the proper protocol to
be implemented between the retention system and the authorized partner requesting a query,
proper and eﬃcient protocol for destruction of CDR data at the end of retention period, imple-
mentation details on the chaining and on the time dilution algorithm, general implementation
notes regarding secure split-role administration. Some of our future work may be related to these
directions.
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